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Kierkegaard without “Leap of Faith” 
Mariele Nientied, Berlin 
The most popular and even famous phrase attributed to 
the Danish philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard 
is the so called “leap of faith”. It is meant to express the 
conviction, that knowledge cannot grasp the highest truth, 
but has to be superseded by radically underived religious 
commitment, namely the passion Kierkegaard calls faith.  
It is striking, however, that the expression “leap of faith” 
(Danish: “Troens Spring”) does not occur even once in the 
published writings. It furthermore has to be conceded, that 
the terms ‘faith’ and ‘leap’ rarely appear in the same 
contexts, nor do variants of these words. The writings, in 
which the leap is discussed, do not address questions of 
faith and vice versa. For example in The Concept of 
Anxiety sin is described to be a leap, as no moral 
considerations, explanations or sufficient reasons ever 
justify evil deeds. Faith, by contrast, is the individual’s 
personal relationship to God, the best example is Abraham 
in Fear and Trembling. Surely the explicit wording is not 
decisive so that the expression “leap of faith” might be 
seen as an appropriate summary of Kierkegaardian 
thinking although it cannot be quoted. Therefore it is worth 
the effort to re-discuss the Kierkegaardian notion of faith 
provoked by this stunning tension between traditional 
scholarship and the results of statistical research.  
This project has the consequence, that labels frequently 
attached to Kierkegaard’s approach have to be reconsid-
ered as they are evoked by the fiction of a “leap of faith”: 
Charges like fideism, voluntarism, decisionism, misologism 
and irrationalism hinge on a radical disjunction of knowl-
edge and faith which turns out to be a misleading 
interpretation. 
I will argue that according to Kierkegaard faith and 
knowledge are not measured by the same epistemological 
standards so that they only differ in degrees of certainty. 
Rather, they turn out to be different kinds of attitude, 
involving different dimensions and capacities of human 
existence. This does not mean, however, that they are 
mutually exclusive modes, as the central figure of the 
paradox in Kierkegaardian thinking illuminates: The 
paradox takes shape, when the limits of reason are 
reached but it can only be apprehended as such, when 
reason is involved and understands why faith is the 
appropriate mode for the truth. At this intersection of 
knowledge and faith something like a leap would not make 
sense. Rather, reason is involved although arguments 
cannot legitimate faith: they can support it in retrospect 
and help to distinguish it from nonsense, discover mistakes 
and unmask religious fanaticism. 
The framework for Kierkegaard’s notion of faith is 
constituted by his account of existence (SV VII, 300ff.) : 
The thinking subject is a fiction, ignorant of the fact that 
every single human being has a unique life with specific 
and changing aspects. Constitutive for someone’s 
personal conditions of existence are his particular 
circumstances, innate capacities, previous choices and the 
theoretical framework that prestructure his thinking. The 
individual’s place in the world is not of his own doing, he is 
born into it. The determining factors of an existence pre-
exist reflection and decision, they have to be taken for 
granted. Existence does not only mean that all knowledge 
is perspectival, but that it is affected by factors it cannot 
control, it is embedded in a factical context.  
Kierkegaard plays on the Latin term “inter-esse” (inter-
est, SV VII, 270) to make his point: the existential 
conditions of human beings are the position between 
freedom and necessity, time and eternity, body and soul, 
general and particular etc. These oppositions are never 
synthesized but coexist in tension; human lives are built on 
contrary principles. Existing is the task to integrate these 
poles, Kierkegaard calls this “becoming a self”, which is 
never fulfilled, as the conditions of an individual life are 
changing. Man’s identity with himself remains fragile and 
vulnerable, it is never a stable and fixed entity as the 
person is unfinished and in process. Likewise, compre-
hensive knowledge is impossible, as no one knows the 
future. Finitude and temporality do not allow to see the 
whole, sub specie aeternitatis. “Interesse” means, that this 
situation cannot be mastered without interest, in the 
indifferent, distanced and neutral attitude of an observer. 
According to Kierkegaard, truth cannot be impartial, 
disinterested and a matter of objective investigation, 
described by a web of propositions, as it concerns the 
whole life. The scope of knowledge proves to be too 
restricted to come to terms with the complexity of the 
existential constellation. Human conditions do not allow for 
a indubitable, necessary and universal theory of truth. 
Thus the classical philosophical endeavour cannot provide 
the truth for an existing human being: A hypothesis that 
has been proved to be correct or a coherent intellectual 
inquiry do not satisfy our existential concern. The crucial 
term is appropriation (Danish: tilegnelse): the truth must 
not only be understood, but it has to be accepted including 
its existential consequences which inform the whole life. 
Once accepted, the truth provides guidelines for decisions 
and actions. Therefore, it is integrated into our world as it 
forms our lives and leads to personal excellence, it is not 
radically transcendent and beyond our world in a separate 
realm, like the supernatural.  
The question why the existential conditions prevent to 
reach the truth by reason leads to the religious dimension: 
sinful individuals are no longer able to activate the truth by 
recollection, provoked by Sokrates’ maieutic activity. After 
the fall, the truth is no longer within us because our 
relationship to God is disturbed. As the story in the book of 
Genesis describes, sin is a consequence of individuals 
who insist on their autonomy, who distance themselves 
from God and disturb their relationship to him by their own 
fault. The attempt to find the truth in man made theory and 
doctrines betrays a fundamental self-deception as sin-
consciousness is missing. As soon as there is an 
awareness of the corruption of a fallen individual, the next 
step would be the insight that only God’s grace can restore 
the original capacity for truth. Therefore, not knowledge 
but a religious attitude is appropriate. Kierkegaard claims 
indeed a radical difference between knowledge and faith: 
the former is validated by intersubjectively shared 
standards and must be based on objective evidence to 
legitimize the claim of correctness. It has to be based on 
strict demonstration and induced by arguments so that 
assent is compulsory. It is re-evaluated continually but can 
only approximate truth as the existential dimension, the 
conditions after the Fall, are ignored. Faith, by contrast, 
involves not only the cognitive, but also the volitional, 
emotional, moral, habitual and other aspects of human 
existence and must be accepted and lived by each 




individual. Hence, it is not designed to compensate lacks 
of knowledge or solve intellectual riddles, it is no proposi-
tional attitude measured by the standards of common 
epistemology but on a lower level of evidence than 
knowledge. The requirements of faith are not completely in 
the power of the believer, but it is a dialogical event, an 
encounter with God and the gift of grace that transforms 
the sinner and restores his capacity for the truth. The 
solution is therefore no act of will on the part of the 
believer, no voluntary leap, no mere decision without 
warrant, which would be sinful as it results from human 
autonomy, like knowledge. 
Yet I think Kierkegaard provoked misunderstandings like 
the “leap of faith”, as his apparent distrust of reason is in 
the context of a polemics directed against Hegel’s 
philosophical enterprise. The opposition of knowledge and 
faith seems to fit in a set of disjunctive relationships like 
objective-subjective; general-particular; cognitive-passion-
ate; compelled-voluntary; possibility-necessity; reasonable-
absurd; conclusion-resolution; logic-conviction; under-
standing-commitment etc. These pairs of contrary terms, 
that can be found throughout the Kierkegaardian author-
ship, remind of Hegelian dialectic, but they remain 
unresolved. The thrust of these polemical chapters is the 
refusal of Hegel’s attempt to integrate religion into the 
system and subordinate it to knowledge as superior mode 
to deal with absolute truth. According to Kierkegaard, 
Hegel’s philosophy of the absolute spirit with an ultimate 
conformity of thought and being extends the philosophical 
inquiry beyond the capacities of an existing human being. 
(SV VII, 99) Like Karl Marx, Kierkegaard insists, that the 
reconciliation of oppositions is by no means realized in our 
concrete historical situation although it is in thought. 
According to Kierkegaard, Hegel forgets that he himself is 
an existing individual and should commit suicide as a 
consequence from his philosophy. (SV VII, 164)  
It is in this context that the crucial figure of the paradox 
takes shape: Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel when he 
appreciates Kant’s antinomies, where both sides are 
equally well founded. Whereas Kant tries to eliminate 
them, Hegel integrates them by dialectical movement and 
subsumes them within a higher unity. Kierkegaard, by 
contrast, leaves the contradictions as they are, he even 
reinforces them to become paradox (SV VII, 182-196 + SV 
VII, 328). A negative, cut-off, two-term dialectic without 
mediation leaves ruptures without resolution in thought.  
This type of paradox results from a careful and reason-
able process of thinking, it is not nonsensical and 
unrelated to all types of arguments. Neither is the paradox 
generated by faith, but it prepares the question of a 
religious solution of intellectual failure. It signals the crisis 
of reason as an intellectual difficulty turns out to be an 
existential and religious problem so that a new mode, faith, 
has to take over. As religious commitment does not follow 
as a matter of course from intellectual considerations even 
if they fail, something like a paradigm shift takes place. 
The best and most radical example is the incarnation, 
Kierkegaard calls it the “absolute paradox” (SV IV, p. 204-
216, Philosophical Fragments, Chapter 3). The eternal 
appears in a historical situation, under temporal conditions. 
This is not a formal or logical contradiction, as we do not 
know what it means to be God, neither do we know 
completely, what it means to be a human being. The 
concepts that form the paradox are not clear, as the 
paradox arises in the experience of a reality our concepts 
cannot deal with. It reveals that the thinking individual has 
been on the wrong track as it tried to find a solution by 
mediating concepts. When we cannot avoid contradictory 
descriptions of this event, this indicates our lack of 
conceptual equipment. The reaction to paradox cannot be 
neutral and indifferent, it offers an alternative in dealing 
with the limits of human reasoning: Either stay within them 
(see the title of Kant’s book Religion within the limits of 
Reason alone) so that human standards of cognition 
provide the framework. From this standpoint, the extraor-
dinary event of incarnation provokes offence (SV VII, 510). 
The other possible reaction is faith: human intellectual 
resources fail and the believer allows to transcend them 
although he is not able to control this process. This is the 
point where no method is available and passion comes in 
as possible grounds are not compulsory. In this context of 
anti-Hegelian polemics the leap occurs to replace the 
impossible mediating third term of a dialectical movement 
(SV VII, 85). These polemic passages and chapters 
suggest labels like “fideism”, which even can be justified by 
quotations; we find slogans like “sacrifice of reason” or 
“crucifixion of the understanding” in Kierkegaard’s writings. 
Unfortunately they have been influential and concealed the 
rather complex epistemological implications of Kierke-
gaard’s anthropology. 
Unlike the fideists, who claim that faith does not need 
and should not seek the support of reason, Kierkegaard 
investigates how far philosophical efforts can reach. Not 
only the limits but also the achievements of reason are 
vital for the paradox. Although Kierkegaard agrees with 
fideists that faith cannot be justified by arguments and that 
natural theology cannot help to find God, he accepts 
arguments to support faith and distinguish it from other 
types of passion and insanity. In Fear and Trembling 
Kierkegaard introduces the traditional formula of the 
absurdity of Christian faith when he discusses Abraham’s 
willingness to sacrifice his son while suspending all moral 
duties. Abraham is obedient to the commanding voice he 
believes to be God’s and prepares the murder of his only 
son. The crucial question is, if the absurd quality of 
Christian faith can be distinguished from mere nonsense, 
from insanity. Every murderer could claim to be obedient to 
divine commandments when killing someone else. If 
religious truth gives its own authenticitation beyond any 
criteria, misuse cannot be avoided. If there are criteria 
upon which a justification can be based, however, faith is 
no longer radically underived and unsharable. When one 
of Kierkegaard’s colleagues at Copenhagen university 
claimed to have experienced a revelation from God, 
Kierkegaard is eager to find criteria in order to unmask this 
as confusion and madness. Although he never judges 
someone else’s relationship to God, as he insists that this 
is a matter of radically hidden inwardness, he diagnosed 
misled religious passion and fanaticism in one of his 
books. (On Authority and Revelation/Das Buch über 
Adler). Thus, he does not try to elaborate positive criteria 
for someone else’s relationship to God, but he describes 
misguided religious attitudes.  
There is no choice of faith over reason in Kierkegaard’s 
authorship; rather the discovery of self-deception leads to 
recognize, that intellectual efforts do not suffice. Although 
Kierkegaard’s fundamental anti-rational stance cannot be 
denied, faith is neither contrary to reason nor incompatible 
with it. Kierkegaard gives good reasons to mistrust man 
made ideas about God and helps to understand why the 
paradox cannot be understood. (SV VII, 505). The 
apprehension of paradox requires a good deal of under-
standing as it must be distinguished from nonsense. If 
human intellect would function properly, Socratic recollec-
tion and Hegelian dialectic could be appropriate ways to 
approach the truth. Kierkegaard emphasizes, that not the 
truth itself is paradox, but it seems to be paradox when 
viewed from sinful existence. (SV VII, 172). The passion of 




faith has to be accompanied by philosophical inquiry, 
although it cannot be derived from it. Simone Weil explains 
why: “L’incompris cache l’incompréhensible, et pour ce 
motif doit être éliminé.” (150, 1991; Vgl. SV VII, 495) “What 
is not understood hides what cannot be understood/is 
beyond understanding and therefore it has to be elimi-
nated”. 
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